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Cartels face three key challenges:  agreeing on a collusive price and allocation of output, 
adhering to that agreement, and preventing entry.  Although company executives may meet in 
smoke-filled rooms and fix prices, many economists believe that these same executives leave 
these meetings and pursue their own individual interests.  To evaluate the challenges to cartel 
stability, we estimate a proportional hazards model over a sample of contemporary international 
cartels.  An important innovation is our analysis of a new data set quantifying the range of 
sophisticated organizational mechanisms used by cartels.  We find that organizational practices 
contribute significantly to cartel stability.  In particular, cartels that used market allocation 
mechanisms were significantly less likely to break up than those that did not.  Negative 
macroeconomic shocks shorten expected cartel duration.  Financial distress of member firms also 
appears to have a negative impact on cartel duration, though sample size limits the precision of 






“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices,” 
wrote Adam Smith over two hundred years ago (Smith 1850, p. 59).  Modern economists, while 
acknowledging that firms attempt to collude now and then, have been skeptical that these 
attempts could have much effect on market outcomes.  Without government assistance, cartels 
would dissolve quickly as each firm was seduced by the temptation to increase its output and 
chisel its price to increase its own individual profits (Stigler 1964).  The cartel’s action to restrict 
output below the individually rational profit-maximizing level gives each firm an incentive to 
increase output beyond the agreed-upon amount.  In other words, company executives exit 
smoke-filled rooms where they have agreed to fix prices and instruct their sales force to undercut 
competitors.  They turn their backs on their partners in crime and pursue their own individual 
interests, to the benefit of consumers.   
In this paper we seek to better understand the determinants of cartel stability (or instability) 
using a sample of international cartels that have been convicted of price fixing over the last two 
decades.  Our sample includes 72 private international cartels, all convicted since 1990 by either 
the United States or the European Union.  Of these 72 prosecutions, 19 were prosecuted in both 
jurisdictions; 20 were U.S.-only cases and 33 were EU-only cases.  Each of these cartels engaged 
in illegal price fixing or market division agreements, and each includes member firms from more 
than one country.1   
Cartels face three key challenges: agreeing on a collusive price and allocation of output 
(with an implicit or explicit division of industry profits), preventing cheating, and preventing 
entry (or growth) by cartel outsiders.  Despite rapid technological change in communications in 
the late twentieth century, cartels still rely heavily on direct, face-to-face meetings and 
negotiations in order to conquer these challenges, perhaps because trust is undermined not only 
by the incentive to cheat but also by the illegality of the activity.2  Cartels use complex measures 
                                                 
1 In some cases, the legally responsible firm is based in the same jurisdiction as its fellow conspirators but is a 
subsidiary of a foreign corporation.  We have included such cases as international cartels.  
2 The relationship between cartel stability and trust is discussed in detail in Leslie (2004). 
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to control prices, various terms of sale and distribution, and, in some cases, investment in 
capacity and sharing of technology.   
In order to address these challenges, cartels develop sophisticated monitoring, 
compensation, and punishment mechanisms.  An important innovation in this paper is our 
analysis of a new data set quantifying the organizational techniques that these cartels used to 
stabilize themselves.  Estimating a proportional hazards model, we find that, at least among those 
cartels that left sufficient records for prosecution, these various organizational practices 
contribute significantly to cartel stability.  We also identify different causes of cartel breakdown 
and estimate a competing risks model to distinguish between those cartels that have responded to 
recent innovations in antitrust prosecution by applying for amnesty, and those that dissolve due 
to antitrust prosecutions triggered for other reasons or due to market forces. 
Along with internal cartel organization, industrial organization literature identifies a 
number of other potential determinants of cartel stability.  Building on the previous theoretical 
and empirical studies that highlight the importance of demand fluctuations on cartel stability, we 
test for the effect of demand fluctuations on cartel stability.  We also test for the effects on cartel 
stability of fluctuations in firm impatience, proxied by the market interest rate and by measures 
of company financial distress.   
The basic theory of cartel duration is laid out in the following section.  We then turn in 
Section III to a description of the data and a categorization of cartel organization techniques, 
with illustrations drawn from a variety of contemporary international cartels.  Sections IV and V 
present the empirical model and results, respectively. 
II. THE THEORY OF CARTEL DURATION 
In a market with identical price-setting firms, infinitely repeated interaction among these 
firms, and perfect information, collusion can be sustained if: 3   
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3 The notation and presentation of the problem of cartel sustainability rely heavily on Tirole (1988), pp. 245-253. 
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M
tip ,  is the collusive (monopoly) price charged by firm i in period t, 
D
tip ,  is the price charged by firm i if it chooses to defect from the collusive agreement, 
C
tip ,  is the price charged by firm i in the continuation equilibrium following a defection 
by one firm, 
iΠ  is the profit earned by firm i in a single period, and 
tδ is the discount factor in period t, with tδ  = e-rτ where r is the instantaneous rate of 
interest, and τ is the real time between periods. 
This inequality, known as the participation constraint, says that permanent collusion can be 
an equilibrium if firms are sufficiently patient and if the difference between the profits earned 
while colluding and the profits earned after a firm cheats is sufficiently high.  A simple 
interpretation of this model would suggest that we observe two types of markets:  those for 
which the participation constraint is not met and in which therefore competitive conditions 
necessarily obtain, and those for which this constraint is met and in which collusion may 
therefore obtain forever.   
What can this model tell us about how long an existing cartel will last?  What factors might 
lead to an existing cartel’s demise?  Some theories of cartel behavior have tried to answer this 
question by considering equilibria in which collusion does last, but in which firm behavior 
fluctuates.4  These fluctuations in behavior are often observationally equivalent to cartel breakup.  
In the discussion that follows, we consider hypotheses regarding the determinants of cartel 
duration that follow from these equilibrium models with behavioral fluctuations.   
We also consider the possibility that, while firms expect this inequality to hold when a 
cartel is formed, the constraint is violated by future, unanticipated shocks.5  In that case, duration 
would be systematically related to the unanticipated shocks that lead to the violation of the 
participation constraint.  This framework motivates our specification of the determinants of 
cartel duration by focusing the analysis on identifying the kinds of shocks that might disrupt 
                                                 
4 Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983) introduced the notion of price wars as equilibrium punishments in 
which it appears that collusion has broken down, but where in fact the cartel shifts to a “punishment phase” that is 
required to maintain incentive compatibility. 
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collusion.  Our research suggests that cartels that endure do so because they develop 
organizational techniques that are effective shock absorbers, allowing them to weather external 
shocks.  In our empirical model, we measure both the external shocks that may disrupt collusion, 
and the organizational techniques cartels have employed to prevent such shocks from disrupting 
collusion.  In the discussion to follow, we identify the broad factors that may determine how long 
cartels will last, and lay out the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical model. 
A. Firm Patience and Collusive Stability 
One of the few generalizations that can be made from the repeated game model of 
collusion is that collusive stability is inversely related to the discount rate:  firms that heavily 
discount future profits cannot be induced to restrict output in the current period.  If the discount 
rate, tδ , fluctuates over time, prices that can be supported as a collusive equilibrium at the 
prevailing discount rate may no longer be supportable if the discount rate falls below some 
critical level.   
The most obvious source of fluctuation in the discount rate is fluctuation in the market 
interest rate.  Thus, an unanticipated increase in the market interest rate may destabilize an 
ongoing collusive equilibrium.  Firm-level changes might also affect the impatience of an 
individual member of a cartel.  For example, the time preference of a privately held firm may 
depend on the age profile of large stockholders.  A firm’s time preference might also change if 
its financing changed to depend more heavily on debt relative to equity.  The increased reliance 
on debt requires fixed payments to lenders, reducing a firm’s discretion and increasing its need 
for cash flow in the short run.6  Lengthening the time between periods of competition also 
increases the discount rate.  While the time between periods is less likely to fluctuate frequently, 
reducing the real time between periods will weaken the constraint on collusive equilibria and 
make collusion less fragile.  Thus, we expect colluding firms to try to enact changes in business 
norms, when feasible, that would shorten the length of time between decision-making periods.  
For example, cartels might agree to eliminate long-term contracts or the extension of credit to 
customers.   
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Harrington (2006) is, as far as we know, the only formal exposition of such a model.  The intuition of his model is 
very similar to the argument we make here. 
6 For a broader discussion of the relationship between free cash flow and managerial decisions, see Jensen (1986). 
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B. Imperfect Information and Collusive Stability 
In some theoretical specifications, collusion essentially ends after some specified history of 
industry interaction because the “punishment” following that history is a permanent or long-term 
reversion to competitive pricing.  In these specifications (for example, Green and Porter, 1984), 
imperfect information makes it impossible for firms to infer with certainty that other firms are 
cooperating.  If, for example, firms only observe their own sales, xit(pit, p-i,t, θ), where θ is a 









ti pp θ,, ,, − ) where Hθ  indicates a high realization of demand and Lθ  indicates a low 
realization of demand.  In such a market it is possible that we could observe collusive behavior 
followed by competitive behavior because a low realization of demand ( Lθ ) occurs which firms 
are unable to distinguish from low pricing by a competitor.   
The reliance on punishments—or the threat of punishments—to sustain collusion has two 
primary implications for cartel duration.  First, cartels are more likely to survive in industries 
where information is better and cartel participants can distinguish between cheating and demand 
fluctuations.  Markets with high variability in demand are more likely to have a realization of 
unexpectedly low demand than relatively stable markets.  Thus we expect that demand 
variability, especially demand variability that cannot be predicted by well-informed market 
participants, is likely to shorten cartel duration.  
Second, because the abandonment of collusion and the enactment of an “equilibrium 
punishment” of permanent or long-term reversion to competitive pricing are costly to firms in 
terms of foregone future profits, firms try to avoid making mistakes in enacting punishments.  
Cartels know that there will be some variation in demand that may cause individual firm’s sales 
or market shares to differ from what the cartel planned.  Cartels plan for this variation in demand 
by using agreed-upon compensation schemes.  In many cases, cartel members that sold more 
than expected must buy output from cartel members that sold less; this, of course, lessens a cartel 
member’s incentive to cheat and sell more than its quota.  In other cases, firms provide 
compensation by allowing their competitors to sell in their designated markets, or they provide 
direct monetary compensation.  While these mechanisms for dealing with variation in market 
outcomes reduce the incentive to cheat, they might raise the risk of detection by competition 
authorities.  We expect that cartels that develop such compensation mechanisms to deal with 
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deviations in cartel member behavior will endure longer, all else equal.  Conversely, we expect 
that legal environments which make the use of compensation schemes more difficult will 
decrease cartel duration. 
Recognizing the complications brought about by imperfect information, cartels often put 
substantial effort into monitoring one another’s activities in order to increase observability, so 
that they can distinguish between the events resulting from demand variability and changes in 
competitors’ prices.  Many cartels exchange output, sales, and price data with each other, or 
forward data to a third party, such as a trade association or an independent auditor.  In other 
cases, cartel members will agree to use a single distributor (such as a joint sales agent) or will 
bring one or more distributors into the cartel.  Engaging the cooperation of a distributor is likely 
to improve the information that the cartel has regarding fluctuations in demand.  A single 
distributor can literally prevent firms from cheating, at least in the short run, because the 
producing firms have no facilities to deliver product to customers and no direct contact with 
customers.   
One of the simplest and most common techniques that cartels use to reduce imperfect 
information and monitoring problems is to assign markets to individual producers.  In some 
cases, individual consumers are allocated to individual producers so that only one cartel member 
is permitted to sell to a particular customer.  In other cases, regions or countries are assigned to 
individual producers.  Assigning countries to individual producers has the advantage that the 
cartel can monitor public information on imports and exports between countries to assure that no 
cartel members are violating the market division agreements.7   
Finally, cartels often find that having agreed on price, cartel participants try to compete in 
other dimensions, such as the provision of credit, transportation, or the quality of the product.  
These other dimensions of competition may be more difficult to observe and monitor than price.  
Competition along non-price dimensions, however, erodes collusive profits in a manner parallel 
to chiseling on price.  Therefore, some cartels explicitly limit competition on such non-price 
dimensions.  
                                                 
7 This does not work in all cases, but it can work if there is only one producer in a given country.  We present an 
example below in which a cartel used export statistics to monitor adherence to the agreement. 
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C. Buyer and Seller Concentration 








, then the returns to collusion for any individual firm will be decreasing in the number of 
firms.  On the other hand, the returns to defection are unlikely to be affected by the number of 
firms in the market.  Thus, the collusive participation constraint is more likely to be binding in 
industries with more firms and lower concentration.  Shocks that affect industry profitability are 
more likely to disrupt collusion in un-concentrated industries than in concentrated ones.  It is also 
likely that the observability of cheating (distinguishing between Lθ  and
C
tip ,− ) is more difficult 
with a large number of firms.  Thus, for a variety of reasons we expect cartel duration to be 
positively related to concentration in the cartelized industry and negatively related to the number 
of participants in the cartel. 
For analogous reasons, new entry into the industry, even if the entrant is welcomed into the 
cartel, will reduce the profitability of collusion and possibly undermine cartel stability.  
Conversely, barriers to entry are expected to increase cartel duration.  Cartels will sometimes 
engage in strategic activities, such as patent pooling, standard setting, or petitioning for anti-
dumping protection, that are designed to increase barriers to entry.   
Turning to the buyer side of the market, theory suggests that buyer size can affect cartel 
stability.  If the customers of a cartel are large relative to the size of the market, the temptation to 
cheat may be greater because each firm will find it easier to “steal” a large proportion of the 
market from other firms (Stigler 1964).  In this case, the short-term profits from deviating from 





i pp −Π , may be close to the entire monopoly profit for the 
industry (for one period).  The larger are the cartel’s customers relative to the size of the market, 
the easier it will be for a single firm offering customers ε−= Mti
D
ti pp ,, , to capture the entire 
market.  Highly concentrated downstream industries imply a small number of (relatively large) 
buyers for the upstream industry.  Thus, we expect cartel duration to be negatively related to the 
concentration of the downstream consuming industry. 
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D. Antitrust Policy and Cartel Duration 
In the last ten years, there has been a major transformation in the attitude of competition 
authorities toward international cartels.  In the past, the most hostile antitrust authorities still 
presumed that international cartels were largely beyond prosecution – either for reasons of 
jurisdiction, difficulties in gaining evidence, or the diplomatic issues raised.  Today, the United 
States, the European Union, Canada, Australia, South Korea, and other countries are willing, 
perhaps even eager, to take on international cartels.  It is this increased prosecution that has 
permitted the creation of the data set analyzed here:  every one of the international cartels in our 
sample was found to have violated competition laws in the United States or Europe.   
Roughly eighty percent of the cartels in the sample ended because of antitrust intervention.  
This might suggest that our empirical investigation should focus on the determinants of 
enforcement and detection, rather than the economic forces that might undermine cartel stability.  
However, the key enforcement instrument used by competition authorities since the mid-1990s 
in uncovering international cartels has been the offer of amnesty or leniency to the first firm that 
cooperates with the competition authorities by providing evidence of collusion.  These amnesty 
and leniency policies (which we discuss in detail below) alter a firm’s decision to participate in a 
cartel.   
In a world of perfect information, a firm that chooses to deviate from the cartel agreement 
will—knowing that its defection would induce a reversion to competition in the industry—
simultaneously apply for amnesty.  In this case, the decision process regarding defection is not 
altered.  Any shock that would cause a previously colluding firm to defect from the cartel would 
also cause that firm to report the cartel to the antitrust authorities.  Thus, when we observe that a 
cartel has been broken up by an amnesty application followed by antitrust enforcement, we 
should also observe some shock that would lead the previously cooperating firm to defect.  In 
some cases, the shock is quite obvious, as when a new owner takes over the firm, discovers the 
illegal activity, and immediately announces that the firm is withdrawing from the cartel and 
applying for amnesty.  In such a case there is a change in either the firm’s rate of time preference 
or its general preferences that leads to a violation of the participation constraint.  The observation 
that the antitrust authorities take an action which ultimately puts an end to the cartel does not 
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vitiate the economic analysis; the antitrust authorities become the instrument of the defecting 
firm. 
In a world of imperfect information, firms will consider the impact of their output 
decisions—to cheat or not—on the likelihood that the industry will revert to competitive 
conditions.  A firm considering a small, profit-increasing deviation would know that such a 
deviation increases the probability (but not the certainty) of retaliation by the rest of the cartel.  
Prior to the adoption of amnesty policies, the worst credible punishment that a cartel could 
threaten to implement was permanent reversion to a competitive equilibrium (either Bertrand or 
Cournot, depending on the market).  But the existence of an amnesty policy creates a more a 
severe, but still credible, punishment instrument, namely competitive reversion combined with 
antitrust prosecution.  In this case, the cheating firm is punished by a fellow cartel member who 
both lowers price and goes to the antitrust authorities, which will result in fines and perhaps jail 
sentences for convicted firms and their executives.  The possibility of a more severe punishment 
increases the size of the set of collusive equilibria and the potential collusive profits available to 
a cartel, making collusion easier and presumably therefore more durable.  Thus, it is theoretically 
possible that these policies decrease the likelihood of cartel breakup.  In those cases where we do 
see cartels broken up by an amnesty application, it is possible that the amnesty application is 
associated with an economic shock that led a firm to choose to deviate (as in the world of perfect 
information) or that we are observing the implementation of an equilibrium punishment.  While 
the policy implications differ, the empirical prediction is the same:  shocks that may vitiate or 
tighten the participation constraint may cause cartel breakup, even breakups initiated by amnesty 
applications. 
Consider now a cartel formed under the earlier antitrust regime, in which firms heavily 
discounted the possibility of antitrust prosecution.  An individual cartel member firm, and each 
of its managers, must consider both the option of defecting and applying for amnesty and the 
possibility of its competitors doing so.  Suppose there is uncertainty on the part of cartel 
members about whether all firms will continue to cooperate.  This could arise because there is 
uncertainty about a competitor’s “type” or because there is asymmetry among the firms, so that 
some firms are closer to the tipping point implied by the participation constraint expressed 
above.  Then the introduction of an amnesty or leniency policy might lead a cartel participant to 
apply for amnesty rather than face the risk of large fines or jail sentences.  It seems likely that 
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firms that apply for amnesty are those close to the tipping point or those that fear that a co-
conspirator is close to the tipping point.  Thus, cartels that are broken up by amnesty applications 
are likely to be more fragile and shorter-lived cartels than those not broken up by amnesty, even 
if there were no amnesty policy.  Therefore, although amnesty policies shorten cartel life, they do 
so disproportionately for cartels that had little effect on profits and were likely to be short-lived 
in any case. Again, the implication for antitrust policy is perhaps a more skeptical approach to 
amnesty, but the empirical prediction does not change.  Amnesty applications should be affected 
by the same economic shocks that lead cartels to break up on their own accord. 
III. DATA 
A. Sample of Contemporary International Cartels 
We consider these issues by examining a sample of 81 private international cartels existing 
in 1990 or later, convicted of price-fixing or market division in either the United States or the 
European Union (or both).8  The cartels in our sample date from 1971 to 2002.9  A cartel meets 
our selection criteria if the participants come from multiple countries.10  Although these cartels 
are international in membership, they may or may not have a global reach.  Many of the cartels 
attempted to set prices worldwide, while others confined their activities to one country, such as 
the United States, or one region, such as Western Europe.  Under current law, virtually all such 
agreements are illegal in these two jurisdictions.11  For 72 of these cartels, we have been able to 
assemble information on the characteristics of the market (such as number of firms and industry 
concentration), characteristics of the cartel, and the cause of cartel breakup.  
                                                 
8 We do not include state-run cartels in the analysis.  State-run cartels, such as OPEC, can have an important impact 
on economic activity, but their goals are more complex than private cartels, including not only the maximization of 
joint profits, but national economic stability and international political influence as well.  The cartel monitoring and 
enforcement tools at the disposal of state-run cartels differ from those available to private firms.  The economic 
models that we discuss here presume a simple profit-maximizing objective function, and are therefore inadequate to 
address the distinct features of state-run cartels. 
9 That is, one cartel of the 72 cartels in our sample—the organic peroxides cartel—began in 1971.  There are two 
cartels, chemical tankers and memory chips, which both ended in 2002. 
10 We use the nationality of the parent company to identify a country of origin for each cartel member.  For example, 
if a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese company is prosecuted for price-fixing, we consider this to be a Japanese 
company. 
11 There are exceptions for certain industries and also for joint export associations.  In the U.S., export associations 
are given limited antitrust immunity under the Export Trading Company Act (1982).  In the European Union, 
countries restrict their competition legislation to the domestic market, with no mention of behavior affecting foreign 
markets. 
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Cartels affect a remarkably broad range of industrial sectors.  Our international cartel 
sample includes firms primarily in sophisticated intermediate manufactured goods and 
services—from commodities like citric acid and methionine (an amino acid used in animal feed), 
to specialized services such as fine arts auctions and wastewater treatment facility construction.  
Chemical products top the list with 42 percent of the sample, as shown in Table 1.  The next 
largest product category is water transportation, including ocean shipping, various ferrying 
operations, and a variety of specialized oil and chemical transport (14 percent of the cartels in 
our sample).  Other manufacturing makes up most of the rest of our sample (38 percent) with 
multiple cartel convictions in steel, carbon and graphite products, plastics, and paper industries 
as well as a smattering of other products, such as beer, haberdashery goods, cartonboard, and 
tobacco processing.  The only categories of products that do not appear in this sample are final 
retail goods and services.   
The distribution of cartel duration in this sample is skewed with a long right hand tail 
(Figure 1).  A non-parametric estimate of the Kaplan-Meier (KM) survivor function, the 
probability of survival past time t, is shown in Figure 2.  The estimated probability of survival 
declines quite sharply in the first five years of a cartel’s life, and then flattens out, so that cartels 
that survive past five years have a reasonable probability of lasting a very long time.  There were 
long-lived cartels, for example, in sorbates, stamp auctions (where a U.S. and European bidding 
ring operated for at least two decades), and organic peroxides.  At the other extreme, fewer than 
ten percent of the cartels in our sample lasted two years or less.  One such cartel is the cross-
Channel ferry operators’ cartel, which was ended by a complaint from the Freight Transport 
Association representing British exporters.12 
The average duration of cartels in our sample was approximately 7.5 years, with a standard 
deviation of 5.4 years (Table 2).  The median lifespan was 6 years.  As shown in Table 2, the 
duration of explicit price-fixing conspiracies in other international samples is comparable.  
Suslow (2005) examines 71 international cartels active before World War II and finds an average 
duration of 8.3 years.13  Eckbo (1976) examines a sample of 52 international cartels spanning 
most of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, and he finds an average duration of 5.3 
                                                 
12 Adrian Strain, “Ferry Giants Hit Back at Price-Fix Charges.” The Evening Standard, March 7, 1995. 
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years.  Griffin (1989) examines 54 international cartels between 1888 and 1984 and finds an 
average cartel lifespan of 7.3 years.  The U.S. comparison is similar, with Posner (1970) and 
Gallo et al. (2000) finding that the average duration of cartels prosecuted by the U.S. government 
was 7.5 and 5.4 years, respectively.  In studies including a measure of variance, the variance in 
cartel duration is high.14  As Stigler (1964) argued, there are cartels that dissolve quickly:  each 
of these national and international samples includes cartels that barely lasted one year.  There are 
other cartels that endure nonetheless, and average cartel duration does not appear to have 
changed substantially over the past century.   
Most of the cartels in our sample consisted of a small number of firms.  The median 
number of firms in our sample of cartels is 5, and the mean is 6.7.  The number of firms ranges 
from two (including two vitamins cartels dominated by Hoffman-LaRoche and BASF) to a 
shipping cartel with thirty-five members.  The existence of some cartels with a large number of 
participants is not as paradoxical as it may seem.  Of the twelve cartels that had more than ten 
members, ten relied on the active involvement of a trade association (discussed further below).  
To get a sense of the data, Figure 3 shows the KM survivor functions where the data are 
segmented on whether the cartel had more than five firms.  Cartels with fewer members appear 
to last longer than cartels with more members.  However, it is likely that cartels with fewer 
members are also cartels in more concentrated industries, since these cartels generally included 
all, or virtually all, industry participants.  Because we expect cartels in more concentrated 
industries to be longer lived, we attempt to disentangle these two effects in the multivariate 
analysis below. 
International cartels occur predominantly in very highly concentrated industries.  The 
average four-firm concentration ratio (C4) for our sample is 79 percent, based on a sub-sample of 
48 cartels for which we can gather market share data.  Three-quarters of the cartels were in 
industries with C4 of over 75 percent or a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of over 1800, the 
threshold for “highly concentrated” industries in U.S. merger review.15  We observe even more 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 The mean duration of all cartel episodes in Suslow’s sample is 8.3 years (standard deviation of 6.2 years).  The 
mean duration of those cartels not censored by the start of World War II (28 of the 71 cartels) was 3.7 years 
(standard deviation of 3 years). 
14 The standard deviation of cartel duration ranges from 2.4 years in Eckbo’s study (a sub-sample for which he is 
able to measure duration), to 6.3 years in Griffin’s study. 
15 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, revised 1997), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm.  
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extreme concentration levels for many cases:  of the 48 cartels for which we were able to obtain 
some measure of industry concentration, 17 operated in industries with a C4 of at least 90 
percent.16   
We have not identified any other studies of international cartels that were able to measure 
industry concentration systematically.17  Instead, many empirical studies of international cartels 
measure the cartel’s market share.  These are generally studies of legal, public cartels, which 
may permit the creation of a formal collusive organization at lower industry concentration levels.  
For example, Griffin (1989) reports the cartel’s market share for a sample of fifty-four 
international cartels:  35 percent of the cartels in his sample have market shares of at least 75 
percent, and 17 percent (9 cartels) have market shares of at least 90 percent.  Suslow (2005) 
reports that for 39 of the 71 cartels in her sample where she was able to gather cartel market 
share data, the average cartel had at least fifty percent of the market.18  In almost all cases in our 
sample, the cartels included all of the major firms, so that our measure of industry concentration 
is close, although not identical, to the cartel market share.  Thus, it seems as though cartel market 
share is much higher in our sample than has been found in previous samples of international 
cartels from an earlier era.  
One might expect that it would be easy to establish that cartels are most common in highly 
concentrated industries, but the empirical relationship is more complicated.19  This is partly 
because concentration is endogenous.  Especially where collusion is legal, cartels may allow 
more firms to remain in the industry than would be sustainable in a more competitive 
environment (Sutton 1991, 1998, and Symeonidis 2002).  One might also expect that explicit 
conspiracies to fix prices would be unnecessarily redundant for firms in highly concentrated 
industries.  The high concentration ratios in our sample may therefore reflect our selection 
criteria, since we are sampling cases of firms who got caught.  Firms in highly concentrated 
                                                 
16 The vast majority of these concentration ratios are for the global market, but there are a few pertaining only to the 
U.S. market if that was the only country in which the cartel tried to fix prices. 
17 In a paper on U.S. price-fixing cases, Hay and Kelley (1974, pp. 22-23) report estimates of industry concentration 
that are roughly comparable to what we find:  “In thirty-eight of fifty cases for which estimates could be made the 
concentration ratio was greater than 50 percent.”  
18 Suslow (2005, p. 12) reports a median value of 1.4 for a dummy variable defined to be 0 if the cartel’s market 
share was below 50%, 1 if it was between 50% and 75%, and 2 if it was greater than 75%. 
19 See Levenstein and Suslow (2006, pp. 57-61) for further discussion of previous findings on the relationship 
between concentration and the likelihood of collusion. 
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industries with keener leadership may be able to find ways to avoid competition without 
resorting to collusion – and the threat of prosecution. 
In some cases, existing concentration ratios reflect the actions that cartels have taken to 
limit entry into their markets.  About one-fourth of the cartels in our sample engaged in some 
type of exclusionary tactics.  For example, both the steel beam and graphite electrode cartels 
were accused of restricting the flow of technical information to outsiders to prevent the 
production process learning necessary to compete in global markets.20  In several other cases, 
cartels were found to have engaged in what one might consider predatory pricing to force rivals 
out of the market.  For example, in 1992 members of the electrical carbon cartel reacted to an 
East German competitor that had entered the market after 1990 unification by refusing to supply 
any graphite to the entrant and by “systematically undercutting it with all customers, so that it 
would not be able to sell anywhere.”21  Similarly, citric acid producers “tried to regain some of 
the customers lost to the Chinese suppliers through concerted and carefully targeted price war.”22  
The most direct form of market exclusion is the acquisition of competitors.  In actions 
reminiscent of John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil, the organic peroxide producers “agreed 
that each of them would purchase such a (new) competitor.  Akzo agreed to acquire the organic 
peroxide business of Nobel and Enichem.  Laporte would purchase Aztec.  Atochem would take 
over [...].  Only the latter did not occur.”23   
B. Organizational Characteristics 
In many instances, the theoretical model of collusion suggests a determinant of cartel 
duration that is influenced both by a variable which is clearly exogenous to the cartel and by the 
activity of the cartel itself.  For example, market concentration is influenced both by the extent of 
economies of scale and by the decision of cartel members to acquire new competitors.  In each of 
these cases, we have attempted to obtain a reasonable proxy for the exogenous determinant of 
                                                 
20 For the steel beam cartel, see Charles Goldsmith and Martin du Bois, “European Commission Fines Steelmakers 
$116.7 Million,” Wall Street Journal Europe, February 17, 1994, p.3.  For graphite electrodes, see “Japanese 
Subsidiary Charged with International Conspiracy to Fix Prices for Graphite Electrodes in U.S.” Department of 
Justice press release, February 23, 1998 (where one of the charges listed is that the conspirators “agreed to restrict 
non-conspirator companies' access to certain graphite electrode manufacturing technology”). 
21 Commission Decision of 3 December 2003, Case C.38.359- Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and Graphite 
Products, par. 157. 
22 European Commission Press Release, “Commission Fines Five Companies in Citric Acid Cartel,” December 5, 
2001. 
23 Commission Decision of 10 December 2003, Case COMP/E-2/37.857-Organic Peroxides, par. 271. 
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cartel stability and to determine what, if any, activities the cartel itself engaged in that would 
affect cartel stability.   
MacKie-Mason and Pindyck (1987), examine the mercury cartel and argue that structural 
factors, such as barriers to entry, are much more important that organizational ones.  In the 
absence of barriers to entry, organizational innovations were able to preserve the formal structure 
of the cartel, but not its ability to increase price.  In contrast, a study of the sugar industry by 
Genesove and Mullin (2001) concludes that organizational learning and innovation were critical 
to the cartel.  Previous cross-sectional studies have qualitatively characterized the various 
mechanisms that cartels use to create barriers to entry and prevent cheating, but have had little 
success in establishing a systematic relationship between organizational variables and collusive 
success.  In part, this is because cartels differ in their ability to develop and implement 
sophisticated cartel organizations as a result of differences in the history of interaction among 
industry participants that affect the level of trust in the industry, differences in their knowledge 
and experience regarding the organization and implementation of cartel agreements, and 
differences in the personalities of managers involved.24   
Table 3 provides a summary of the organizational mechanisms employed by our sample of 
contemporary international cartels, and compares it to several studies of U.S. price-fixing cases.  
Over eighty percent of the cartels in our sample allocated geographic markets or assigned 
specific customers to cartel members.  There are two main explanations for this.  First, national 
barriers provide a ready mechanism for dividing markets and monitoring cartel adherence to the 
agreement.25  For example, Hoffman-LaRoche, the world’s leading producer of vitamin B2, 
monitored Japanese government export data knowing that there was only one cartel member, 
Takeda, producing in that geographic location.26  National boundaries also provide focal points 
and institutionally-supported market divisions (supported by differences in language, currency, 
and distribution networks) that can facilitate collusion.  Thus, removing trade barriers across 
                                                 
24 Spar (1994), focuses on how prior interactions among firms influence expectations and therefore the set of 
feasible equilibria.  She concludes that cartels are “best managed by those producers who are able to keep the circle 
of negotiators small, the rules flexible, and the power to retaliate as strong as possible” (p. 219).  Baker and Faulkner 
(1993) argue that organizational issues were critical to the success of the electrical equipment conspiracies of the 
1950s. 
25 This has been true of international cartels in the past:  See Liefmann (1927, pp. 130-131), describing how 
international cartels allocate markets geographically.  Suslow (2005, p. 12) reports that 40 percent of her sample of 
inter-war international cartels assigned exclusive territories to cartel participants.   
26 Commission Decision of 21 November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 - Vitamins, par. 289.  
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national boundaries may not give rise to competition as readily as has been expected, especially 
in highly globally-concentrated industries.  Second, it is possible that the use of market allocation 
mechanisms reflects increasing sophistication of cartels as firms gain experience with collusive 
devices.  While cartels often begin with simple agreements over price, the participants regularly 
find that collusion only succeeds when those agreements are bolstered by other mechanisms to 
limit competition.   
In some markets, customers or market shares are assigned by engineering the rotation of 
bids among cartel participants.  Bid rigging requires more coordination and more specific 
mechanisms for hiding collusion than other types of collusion, but also sometimes—particularly 
in the case of governmental customers—provides public information that cartel participants can 
use to monitor cooperation.  Bid rigging often requires additional mechanisms for compensating 
the “losing” bidders.  For example, members of a cartel fixing the price of postage stamps 
“carried out the bid-rigging schemes by participating in secret pre-auctions to determine which 
stamp dealer would be the bidder for specific lots of stamps at the subsequent public auction … 
and by making payments to stamp dealers who agreed not to bid at public auctions when they 
were not the high bidder at the pre-auction.”27  
Joint distribution agreements are the strongest form of market allocation that cartels use.  
Historically, cartels often turned to joint distributors who would simply eliminate cheating by 
having all sales funneled through a single central sales organization.  In today’s legal 
environment, such an obvious mechanism for eliminating competition would quickly attract the 
attention of antitrust authorities.  Not surprisingly, we do not observe the use of joint sales 
agencies in our sample.  However, in 14 percent the cartels in our sample (Table 3) we see active 
cartel participation by distributors, whether independent firms or producer-owned. 
Cartel adaptability is reflected as well in the 47 percent of cartels that agreed to limit 
competition on dimensions other than price.  These agreements often restricted the offering of 
discounts, the provision of credit, or the absorption of transportation costs.  In other cases, the 
agreements went further, restricting advertising and point-of-sale promotions, as members of the 
                                                 
27 Department of Justice press release “California stamp dealer charged with rigging auctions,” June 26, 2002.  See 
Kwoka (1997) for another example of a bid-rigging cartel using a post-auction redistribution mechanism. 
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beer cartel agreed to do, or restricting interest free loans, charitable donations, and advances paid 
to sellers, as agreed to by members of the fine arts cartel.28   
A smaller proportion of cartels (six percent) adopted agreements standardizing the product 
itself.  For example, the isostatic graphite cartel “agreed... to standardize the grades of non-
machined and semi-machined isostatic graphite offered to customers in the United States and 
elsewhere for the purpose of facilitating the implementation of the … agreement…”29  The pre-
insulated steel heating pipe cartel “used quality norms [enforced by the trade association] to keep 
up prices and delay the introduction of new cost-saving technology.”30  These provisions limit 
the other dimensions on which member firms might chisel price.  Recent research on semi-
collusion has established that agreements that restrict competition on price but not other 
dimensions of competition can actually leave the colluding firms worse off than if they had not 
colluded at all (for example, Feuerstein and Gersbach 2003).  Cartel participants prevent (or try 
to prevent) such outcomes by developing more complete agreements that cover all significant 
dimensions of competition. 
As discussed above, preventing cheating is one of the central challenges cartels face.  
Cartels have developed a variety of mechanisms to address this challenge:  1) schemes to 
increase the information that firms have about one another and the market; 2) schemes to 
compensate one another when firms’ sales vary from assigned quotas due to factors outside of 
their control, such as random fluctuations in demand; and, 3) schemes to punish firms when 
violations do occur.  We address each of these mechanisms—monitoring, compensation, and 
punishment—in turn. 
Almost three-quarters of the cartels in our sample exchanged information on sales, 
production, and price in order to monitor individual firm behavior and market trends (Table 3).  
In some cases, cartel members monitored one another directly.  For example, the industrial 
copper tubes cartel fixed target prices at meetings each autumn.  Then, “[i]n the spring meeting 
they monitored compliance with the agreed targets by analyzing the general market information 
                                                 
28 Commission Decision of 5 December 2001, Case IV/37.614/F3 PO (Interbrew and Alken-Maes), par. 44, 47; 
“Sotheby's and Former Top Executive Agree to Plead Guilty To Price Fixing On Commissions Charged to Sellers 
At Auctions,” Department of Justice press release, October 5, 2000; and “Commission rules against collusive 
behavior of Christie's and Sotheby's,” European Commission press release, Oct. 30, 2002. 
29 United States of America v. Carbone of America Industries Corp. and Michel Coniglio; Criminal No. 00-129, 
March 13, 2000, p. 5. 
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and the development of their market shares.... [Cartel members appointed] market leaders who 
monitored customer visits and informed the other cartel members of the evolution of the contract 
situation within their respective territories.”31  The vitamin A and E cartels had some of the most 
sophisticated monitoring mechanisms we observe.  The “BASF documents consist of (a) 
worksheets or support documents used to fix the annual 'budget' for each producer on a country-
by-country basis and (b) charts comparing the actual sales of each producer with their respective 
'budgeted volumes', i.e. their quota for each regional and national market both on an annual basis 
and for the interim periods....”32   
In other cases, cartels turned to third parties to collect, review, and sometimes aggregate 
data for use by individual cartel members.  Members of the pre-insulated pipe cartel had their 
auditors certify “the total sales of pipes during the year, and the certificates were then exchanged 
among the cartel participants.”33  Some European cartels, such as the cartonboard cartel, took 
this one step further by engaging the services of Fides, a trust or fiduciary company, to assist in 
data collection:  
Fides is a fiduciary company located in Zurich which (amongst other activities) 
manages information exchange systems for various industries....In the context of 
the successful implementation of price initiatives, it was considered essential to 
develop a comprehensive system for the reporting and monitoring of production, 
sales volumes and capacity utilization.  Most of the members of the PG 
Paperboard contributed periodic (weekly, monthly, six-monthly, annual) reports 
on orders, production, sales and capacity utilization to Fides....Under the Fides 
system the individual reports were collated centrally and the aggregated (and 
supposedly anonymized) data then sent to the participants.34 
In some cases, the implementation of sophisticated monitoring and market allocation 
systems was accomplished by the development of a hierarchical structure within the cartel itself.  
Almost 40 percent of the cartels in our sample developed an internal hierarchy.  For example, in 
the electrical carbon cartel, senior executives attended “summit meetings” held twice per year.  
These were followed by “technical meetings”: 
                                                                                                                                                             
30 Commission Decision of 21 October 1998, Case No IV/35.691/E-4 – Pre-insulated Pipe Cartel, par. 2. 
31 Commission Decision of 16 December 2003, Case C.38.240 – Industrial Tubes, par. 85, 198. 
32 Commission Decision of 21 November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, par. 191. 
33 Commission Decision of 21 October 1998, Case No IV/35.691/E-4 – Pre-insulated Pipe Cartel, par. 33. 
34 Commission Decision of 13 July 1994, Case IV/C/33.833 – Cartonboard, par. 27, 61-62. 
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Technical Committee meetings [were] held twice a year to agree on price levels 
and percentage price increases for different products in different countries. … 
Local meetings [were held on an ad hoc basis to discuss price increases and 
accounts of single local customers.] Regular contacts … on a weekly and 
sometimes daily basis ... were necessary to ensure that the agreements were being 
upheld.35 
Similarly, the copper plumbing tubes cartel designated a national “market leader” who 
“reported on developments in its home market to the other participants, so that these could better 
coordinate their behavior.”36  In a remarkable resonance to the U.S. electrical equipment 
conspiracy of the 1960s, in which different levels of management of the cartel received their own 
monikers, the copper plumbing cartel distinguished between the “elephant meetings” of top level 
managers and the “sweepers meetings” of operational managers.37  Similarly, the citric acid 
cartel had its “masters” and “sherpas,” and the graphite electrodes cartel had its “top level” group 
and “working level” group.38  
The vitamin A cartel once again provides one of the most elaborate examples of this 
practice, with four layers of cartel management:  top level, heads of marketing, global product 
marketing level, and regional product marketing level.  The higher level managers met 
infrequently to set overall strategy, quotas and prices, and lower level managers met more 
frequently to monitor compliance at a global and regional level.39 
As yet another mechanism for bolstering their monitoring effort, many cartels turn to trade 
associations to perform various monitoring activities.  Twenty-nine percent of the cartels in our 
sample actively used trade associations to facilitate collusion.  It would appear from Table 3 that 
the use of trade associations in our sample is similar to that found in earlier studies, but a closer 
examination suggests something different.  Of the twenty-one cartels in our sample with trade 
association involvement, none involve a U.S. trade association.  Fourteen cases involve pre-
existing European trade associations whose activities in facilitating collusion probably pre-date 
                                                 
35 Bertus Van Barlingen, “Commission fines five companies in carbon and graphite products cartel,” Competition 
Policy Newsletter, No. 1, Spring 2004, p. 44. 
36 European Commission press release, “Commission fines companies in copper plumbing tubes cartel,” Sept. 3, 
2004. 
37 European Commission press release, “Commission fines companies in copper plumbing tubes cartel,” Sept. 3, 
2004. 
38 Kurt Eichenwald, “U.S. Wins a Round Against Cartel,” New York Times, January 30, 1997, p. D1; Levenstein and 
Suslow (2004), p. 833. 
39 Commission Decision of 21 November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, par. 172-188. 
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the recent changes in EU law and enforcement policies, which have made the legal environment 
much more hostile to price-fixing than in years past.  Six of the seven trade associations that 
reach beyond Europe are related to shipping cartels that also evolved from associations or 
agreements that pre-date current competition policy.  Several of these shipping associations were 
in fact formed after previous cooperative agreements were banned by the European Commission.  
Finally, one cartel (lysine) strategically formed an international trade association as a cover for 
its activities.  Thus, it appears that American trade associations have learned to refrain from 
involvement in such conspiracies. 
Despite a cartel’s best efforts, individual firm sales do not always match assigned quotas.  
This may occur because of the cartel’s inability to predict customer demand perfectly.  Or it may 
occur because cartel participants cheat on the agreement.  Cartels do their best to use the 
information gathering techniques described above to distinguish between cheating and random 
fluctuations in demand.  Cartels do not want to disrupt collusion, losing profits and undermining 
trust, by retaliating when a firm has not cheated (or even sometimes when they know that a firm 
has cheated).  On the other hand, they do not want to tolerate firms obtaining more than their 
allocated market share, as that simply rewards cheating and will undermine the cartel.   
As a result, many cartels – 28 percent of our sample – adopt formal compensation rules.  
The simplest way to accomplish such compensation is with side payments.   However, side 
payments leave a paper trail that increases the likelihood of successful antitrust prosecution.  The 
most common compensation procedure for cartel members who have sold more than their share 
is to require them to purchase output from those who have sold less. Sales between competitors 
may have legitimate non-collusive justifications, but they are also very useful in facilitating 
collusion.  These sales not only reduce a firm’s incentive to cheat, they also eliminate the 
necessity for firms to agree on profits lost by the firm selling less than its allocated share.  Again, 
Vitamin A provides a particularly well-developed example: 
[I]f one was seen to be selling more than its allocated quota, it would have to 
‘slow down’ sales to enable the others to catch up.  If at the end of the year a 
producer was substantially ahead of its quota, it had to purchase vitamins from the 
others in order to compensate them for the corresponding shortfall in their 
allocation.40 
                                                 
40 Commission Decision of 21 November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, par. 196. 
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We distinguish the use of a compensation scheme, agreed upon prior to the realization of 
market sales, from the use of punishments implemented when the cartel believes that a member 
reneged on an agreement.  Where possible, we have identified the use of disciplinary actions 
imposed by the cartel in response to violations.  While obviously the possibility of punishment—
the threat of retaliation—is critical to cartel success, and was almost universal among the cartels 
studied here, the implementation of punishments is considerably less common than compensation 
schemes, occurring in only 13 percent of the cartels in our sample.  In fact, where punishments 
do occur they seem to reflect not just violations of the agreement, but disagreements about what 
the terms of collusion should be.  In some cases, the punishment took the form of a price war, as 
when a pre-insulated pipe producer (Løgstør) refused the terms proposed by ABB, the industry 
leader.  This provoked “a strong negative and personal reaction from ABB” and a decrease in 
prices in major markets by 20%.  It did not end the cartel:  “the producers continued to meet, 
even if for some time the multilateral meetings were replaced by bilateral and trilateral 
contacts.”41  In other cases, price wars were not the punishment of choice.  For example, 
Mitsubishi “tried to punish [other thermal fax paper producers] by cutting off their supply when 
they refused to sell the paper at the recommended prices.”42   
Combining this “punishments” category with exclusionary actions carried out by the cartel 
allows us to compare our sample characteristics to other studies.  The exclusionary tactics are 
those mentioned earlier, such as restricting access to technology, targeted price wars, and 
acquisition of competitors.  Thirty-nine percent of the cartels in our sample used some form of 
disciplinary or exclusionary tactics.43  The frequency of these actions recorded in earlier studies, 
as shown in Table 3, is much lower:  between five and twelve percent of cartels exhibited this 
behavior.  Although it may be that cartels have grown more sophisticated in their use of 
punishments and exclusionary tactics, we expect that part of the reason for the difference lies in 
the more elaborate records currently made public by antitrust authorities. 
In total, we have coded eleven cartel organization characteristics.  Descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 4 for the organizational variables (those ending with “ORG”), as well as the 
other variables included in the empirical model discussed below.  In order to preserve degrees of 
                                                 
41 Commission Decision of 21 October 1998, Case No IV/35.691/E-4 – Pre-insulated Pipe Cartel, par. 52. 
42 “Madhavi Acharya, “Toronto Company Files Mitsubishi Suit,” The Toronto Star, Feb. 17 1999. 
24 
freedom, in some of our econometric specifications we combine these various organizational 
characteristics into one index called ORGINDX.44  This eleven-point index assigns one point for 
each of the following cartel characteristics:  bid rigging; market or customer allocation; 
agreement to standardize product characteristics or limit product quality; agreeing to other terms 
and conditions of sale; inclusion of distributors or producer/distributor firms; trade association 
participation; monitoring of output and pricing; disciplinary actions in response to cartel 
violations (cartel-imposed); compensation scheme or penalties for exceeding cartel quotas (self-
imposed); exclusionary actions to prevent entry or expansion by non-members; and, 
organizational hierarchy within the cartel.   
The mean value of the organizational index is 3.8, with a range from zero (the plastic 
dinnerware cartel, lasting less than a year) to eleven (the pre-insulated pipe cartel, involving ten 
vertically integrated firms and lasting about seven years).  The KM comparison of the survival 
probability of cartels segmented by whether they had more or less than the average 
organizational level is shown in Figure 4.  Cartels with greater organizational sophistication 
appear to be more likely to survive at every age than less organized cartels. 
C. Measuring Cartel Duration and Tracing the Cause of Cartel Breakup 
Given the variety of collusive punishments and the degree of discretion cartel participants 
have in choosing how and to what degree to punish, researchers face substantial challenges in 
determining when a cartel comes to an end, and when, or if, it begins anew.  We rely heavily on 
descriptions of cartel activities provided by antitrust authorities.  This has several implications 
for our measure of cartel duration.  First, the start date for a cartel is often dictated by the 
information available to the enforcement authorities.  It is clear that in many cases the authorities 
(or the customers) suspect that the cartel had earlier beginnings, but there is insufficient evidence 
to support prosecution based on earlier dates.  Also, different firms can join a cartel at different 
dates, and sometimes cartels begin in one region and expand to other areas.  In order to at least 
                                                                                                                                                             
43 The 13 percent figure mentioned in the previous paragraph is a component of the 39 percent mentioned here.  
Other researchers using cross-section samples are not able to separately analyze the implementation of punishments. 
44 Griffin (1989) also creates a measure of internal cartel organization to capture the extent of control that the cartel 
has over member operations, but the information on which he bases his index is not clear.  He states that it “is a 
subjective measure assigned after reading the available descriptions of the effectiveness of the cartel structure” (p. 
191). 
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partially capture these nuances, we take the “birth” of the cartel to be the first known agreement 
between any two members of the cartel. 
There are also difficulties measuring cartel breakup.  In particular, the authorities do not 
distinguish between cartels that have continued to meet with little effect on price and those that 
are functioning effectively.  In some cases, the cartels themselves are not sure whether the cartel 
has ended, as the following passage from the European Commission decision on the organic 
peroxides cartel illustrates: 
The parties confirm that around 1992, tensions between the companies were 
rising, but their views vary and differ as to the timing, intensity and duration of 
the tensions.  In particular they disagree as to whether the agreement was 
terminated and later replaced or only certain contacts at high level were 
suspended.  PC and Akzo consider the period of tensions to mark the end of one 
cartel and the beginning of another.  Atochem, in contrast, sees the period of 
tensions not as the end of the agreement but as a period when the agreement did 
not work well.45 
As we turn to the empirical analysis of cartel duration, it is important to keep in mind that 
we are measuring the formal breakup of an informal institution.  In general we date the end of a 
cartel as when the cartel members give up trying to sustain collusion, as that is what is generally 
observable to us.  As long as they are negotiating, it is clear that some members believe that there 
is a mutually beneficial collusive outcome.  What is less clear is whether they have located a set 
of equilibrium strategies that will support such an outcome. 
To analyze the determinants of cartel breakup, we have coded the “cause of death” for each 
of the cartels in the sample (Table 5).  The broadest distinction is between those cartels for which 
the proximate cause of breakup was government antitrust enforcement, and those that dissolved 
for other reasons, such as cheating or a growing fringe of non-cartel producers.  In order to 
identify precipitating factors of antitrust investigations, it is important to understand the recent 
evolution of antitrust enforcement in the United States and the European Union.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) has had a corporate amnesty program since 1978, but it was largely 
ineffective because of the ambiguity surrounding whether a company would qualify for amnesty.  
In 1993, the DOJ revised and expanded its amnesty policy, offering automatic amnesty from 
fines and jail terms to the first cartel member who voluntarily and prior to any governmental 
                                                 
45 Commission Decision of 10 December 2003, Case COMP/E-2/37.857 – Organic peroxides, par. 131. 
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investigation offers evidence of a cartel and agrees to cooperate in its investigation.46  The 
number of corporations coming forward and seeking amnesty rose in the early 1990s from 
roughly one per year to one per month.47  This trend has continued to accelerate:  by 2003, the 
DOJ was receiving roughly two amnesty applications per month.48  The percentage of foreign 
defendants has also risen dramatically.49   
The European Commission (EC) also has an amnesty policy, first implemented in 1996 and 
then revised and strengthened in 2002.  The EC grants full immunity to the first company to 
submit sufficient evidence which allows the Commission “to launch an inspection at the 
premises of the companies allegedly involved in the cartel.”50  Some companies will 
simultaneously apply to multiple jurisdictions for amnesty, as Christie’s art auction house did in 
2000.51  As shown in Table 5, there are eleven cartels in our sample that ended due to an 
application for amnesty, and these cartels lasted an average of 9.5 years.   
We distinguish these amnesty-instigated investigations from cartel breakups where a 
government-initiated investigation followed from the investigation of another cartel.  There are 
thirteen such cartels in our sample, with an average duration of 8.2 years.  There are formal and 
informal ways that follow-on prosecutions can occur.  The DOJ has an “Amnesty Plus” program 
that offers leniency to firms caught in the investigation of a cartel for which they are not eligible 
for amnesty if they provide information about a second cartel that was previously unknown to 
                                                 
46 See Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Leniency Policy Documents, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
public/criminal.htm (linking to the current corporate and individual amnesty policies of the U.S. Department of 
Justice). 
47 See Anne K. Bingaman, Opening Markets and Protecting Competition for America’s Businesses and Consumers:  
Goals and Achievements of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Fiscal Year 1993 through March 
1996, Report for 1996 Spring Meeting of the Section of Antitrust Law 8 (1996). 
48 R. Hewitt Pate, “The DOJ International Antitrust Program – Maintaining Momentum,” Address Before the 
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law (Feb. 6, 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200736.htm.  Pate states that:  “The Division’s leniency program has 
played a major role in cracking the majority of the international cartels that the Division has prosecuted.  The 
application rate has surged over the last year to better than two per month” (p.6). 
49 Adler and Laing (1997):  “In 1991, only 1 percent of corporate defendants were foreign and no foreign individuals 
were charged that year.  From July 1996 to January 1997, 20 percent of all corporations and 27 percent of all 
individuals charged were foreigners” (p. 1). 
50 European Commission Leniency Policy, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/leniency.  
There are other conditions required for full immunity, such as putting an immediate end to the infringement and not 
playing a role as the ring leader of the cartel.  See, European Commission, Directorate-General for Competition, 32nd 
Report on Competition Policy, 2002, p. 18 (available at 
ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/annual_reports/2002/report_short_en.pdf). 
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the authorities.52  The European Commission does not have a formal “amnesty plus” process, but 
there are often cases where it is clear that the EC discovered a cartel as the result of an earlier 
cartel investigation.  In the private label beer cartel in Belgium, for example, Interbrew informed 
the European Commission while it was being investigated regarding a separate beer cartel (also 
in Belgium).53  Takeda, a Japanese chemical firm, informed the European Commission about the 
cartel in nucleotides (a food flavor enhancer) in September 1999, when the vitamins cartels, of 
which it was also a member, began to unravel due to government investigations which began the 
year before.54  
Since the DOJ rarely publicizes who receives Amnesty Plus, we have in most cases 
inferred whether a cartel investigation was a direct follow-on from an earlier investigation, both 
for DOJ and EC cases.  Amnesty plus applications, or less formal efforts to “come clean” about 
all industry cartels once a cartel is discovered in one product line, are generally offered under the 
duress of antitrust prosecution.  We therefore expect that the determinants of when a cartel is 
broken up by follow-on confessions once one cartel is uncovered will differ from those offered 
under a voluntary amnesty plan.   
Some government prosecutions are instigated not by producers, but by customers.  In our 
sample there are eight cases where a customer complaint triggered an investigation and the 
eventual breakup of the cartel.  These cartels had an average duration of 5.3 years.  The first 
vitamin cartel to be investigated (vitamin E) falls into this category, as do the cross-channel ferry 
operators cartel, graphite electrodes, thermal fax paper, stainless steel, and several shipping 
cartels. 
                                                                                                                                                             
51 “Christie's approached regulators on both sides of the Atlantic in 2000 and owned up to wrongdoing in exchange 
for leniency which could take the form of a reduced fine.”  (Osborne, Andrew, “Sotheby's, Christie's in price scam, 
says EC,” The Guardian, 20 April 2002.) 
52 The amnesty plus program is summarized in Hammond (2004).  There is also a policy known as “affirmative 
amnesty” the DOJ will offer amnesty to firms in return for their cooperation in an investigation, even when the DOJ 
already has knowledge of a cartel’s existence, in order to obtain the evidence necessary for a prosecution.  See 
Hammond (2006), p. 11. 
53 European Commission press release, “The Commission fines brewers in market sharing and price fixing cartels on 
the Belgian market,” Dec. 5, 2001. 
54 Commission Decision of 17 December 2002, Case COMP/C.37.671 — Food flavor enhancers, par. 43.  The EC 
decision on the vitamins cartel documents the fact that the vitamins case broke in 1998:  “On 8 May 1998 the 
District Court of Northern Texas issued a Grand Jury subpoena on Roche's US subsidiary company in connection 
with investigations by the Justice Department into the vitamins market.” (Commission Decision of 21 November 
2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 — Vitamins, par. 149.) 
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Finally, the last category of government breakup of cartels comes from those cases where 
an agency investigation arises from any remaining sources of information (other than amnesty 
applications, follow-on investigations, and customer complaints).  This is in fact the most 
numerous category for our sample:  28 of 72 cartels fall into this category, with average duration 
of 7.6 years.  In the chemical tankers, ferrosilicon, citric acid and lysine cases, for example, a 
whistleblower triggered the investigation.55  In the memory chip cartel, a Dell executive publicly 
blamed memory chip price increases on cartel-like behavior, prompting more general awareness 
among customers about the price increases as well as government investigations.56  In the pre-
insulated pipe cartel, it was a competitor who sent a complaint to the EC.  This cartel made 
numerous attempts push Powerpipe out of business, or at least keep it from expanding from 
Sweden into Germany, the most lucrative market for the cartel.  Powerpipe alleged to the 
Commission that cartel members “had taken concerted steps to damage the business of 
Powerpipe and/or confine its activities to the Swedish market and/or drive it out of business 
altogether by (inter alia) systematically luring away key management personnel and unlawfully 
interfering with its contractual relations with customers and suppliers.”57 
There are often multiple factors that contribute to cartel breakup.  For each cartel in our 
sample, we have attempted to select the factor that was most significant in the cartel’s final 
breakup.  There are only two cartels in our sample that we code as breaking up primarily due to 
cheating, and they lasted a brief 1.5 years on average.  The short-lived aluminum phosphide 
cartel, for instance, ended because one firm charged substantially lower prices than the target 
price set by the cartel.58  There are, however, numerous cartels where cheating was an issue 
either intermittently or throughout the life of the cartel.  Some of these cartels eventually ended 
when a firm applied for amnesty, and we code them as ending due to government investigation 
triggered by an amnesty application.  Thus, for many of the cartels cheating was a fact of life—a 
reality of running the organization—but not a cause of death. 
                                                 
55 We distinguish whistleblower-initiated investigations from amnesty applications because these are cases where 
the DOJ or EC was informed by the whistleblower on their own behalf.  In contrast, when companies apply for 
amnesty, it is on behalf of the entire company and all of its executives. 
56 Kanellos, Michael, “Dell Trying to Sidestep Chip ‘Cartel’,” CNET News.com, April 30, 2002. 
57 Commission Decision of 21 October 1998, Case No IV/35.691/E-4 – Preinsulated Pipe Cartel, par. 20. 
58 Dauner, John T. “Foreign conspiracy Trial Begins in KCK Others Already Have Pleaded Guilty to Similar 
Charges,” The Kansas City Star, July 14, 1994. 
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Cartels that broke up on their own due to a growing fringe (prior to any antitrust action) 
lasted on average 6.4 years.  Several of the vitamins cartels fit into this category.  The vitamins 
cartels for B1, B2, and B6, for example, all ended primarily due to growing Chinese exports.  
Cheating was also an issue, particularly in the B2 cartel, but entry of Chinese production was the 
catalyst.  For vitamin B6 it was particularly pronounced, with the Chinese share growing from 
three percent of the world market in 1991 to forty-eight percent in 1993:  “Roche says that by the 
first half of 1994 the parties recognised that the vitamin B6 agreement was no longer viable 
owing to the Chinese imports and decided to end the agreement.”59  
Cartels that applied for amnesty, prior to any known antitrust investigation of their firm, 
were actually relatively long-lasting cartels (with an average duration of 9.5 years), contrary to 
what the theoretical discussion above suggested.  Even those that were terminated as a result of a 
follow-on investigation, having been discovered colluding in other markets, were relatively long-
lived (with an average duration of 8.2 years).  This suggests that amnesty and leniency policies 
have been able to disrupt long-lived cartels.  Figure 5 confirms this, by contrasting the KM 
survival function for cartels broken up by amnesty applications, other causes of antitrust 
investigations, and cheating or competition from a growing fringe.  What is perhaps most 
interesting about this picture is that the cartels ended by applications for amnesty do not appear 
to have been shorter lived.  At least over the last fifteen years, it appears that the U.S. Justice 
Department’s amnesty program and the European Union’s more recent leniency program have 
caught quite long-lived cartels in their net.60 
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
A. Hazard Model 
In order to examine these issues empirically, we estimate a proportional hazard model, 
specifying the probability of cartel breakdown as a function of variables thought to influence the 
                                                 
59 Commission Decision of 21 November 2001, Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, par. 348. 
60 Harrington (2006) presents a theoretical model designed to characterize the change in the distribution of cartels 
(by cartel age) resulting from a change in antitrust policy, and the distribution of those cartels caught by the 
government.  He summarizes one of his main theorems relating antitrust enforcement and cartel duration as follows:  
“…a rise in [detection and conviction] causes the immediate collapse of the least stable cartels….  This means the 
surviving cartels are those [of] … longer duration.  Since this is the pool from which one draws discovered cartels, 
the average duration of discovered cartels rises in the short-run in response to a more aggressive detection and 
conviction policy” (p. 15).  Our descriptive empirical statistics support Harrington’s theoretical conclusions. 
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stability of collusion.  The hazard function h(x) is the ratio of the probability density function 
f(x) to the survival function S(x), given by  
( ) ( )( ) ,
( ) 1 ( )
f x f xx
S x F x
λ = =
−  
where F(x) is the cumulative distribution function.  The hazard rate is the probability that an 
event occurs (i.e., the cartel dissolves) at time t, given that it has not already occurred. 
A proportional hazard model with a vector of covariates, x, can be written as 
0( ; ) ( ) ( ),t tλ κ λ=x x  
where κ(.)>0 is a nonnegative function of x and λ0(t)>0 is the underlying or baseline hazard.  The 
baseline hazard is common to all subjects in the population.  It is invariant across cartels, but can 
be any separable function of time.  Individual hazard functions differ proportionately based on a 
function κ(x) of observed covariates.  Typically, κ(.) is parameterized as κ(x)=exp(xβ), where β 
is a vector of parameters and exp(xβ) is a shift factor that depends on cartel or industry 
characteristics.  Taking logs of both sides yields:   
0log ( ; ) log ( ),t tλ λ= +x xβ  
where βj measures the semi-elasticity of the hazard with respect to xj.  
In our application we are interested in how the covariates shift the hazard function, in 
which case the estimation of λ0 is not necessary.  Cox (1972) obtained a partial maximum 
likelihood estimator for β that does not require estimating λ0. 
Let us assume now that  
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where λ(t;x) is the hazard at time t for a cartel with covariate vector x = (x1, x2, …, xp).  The 
parameter vector β  is estimated via a maximum likelihood approach.   
Note that if we change the measurement of one covariate, say x1, by one, and keep other 




























− + + + = =
 
Thus, the estimated coefficient is the natural logarithm of the hazard rate ratio when x1 is 
increased by one unit.  We estimate the probability that a cartel that has lived to year t – 1 breaks 
up in year t as a function of the parameter vector β which includes characteristics of the cartel, 
the market, and the economic environment in year t.  An estimated hazard rate ratio greater than 
one indicates that the covariate is associated with an increased hazard of cartel breakup.  A 
hazard ratio less than one indicates that an increase in the covariate is associated with a decrease 
in the hazard or failure rate.   
B. Determinants of Cartel Duration 
We estimate the determinants of cartel duration, including variables whose fluctuations are 
likely to cause violations in the participation constraint and variables that reflect the cartel’s 
ability to prevent, absorb, or respond to shocks.   
In order to measure the impact of fluctuations in firm impatience on the probability of 
cartel breakup, we include several alternative specifications of the discount rate of cartel member 
firms.  Assuming that there are efficient capital markets to which all firms have equal access, the 
market interest rate is the best proxy of the (common) discount rate of all cartel members.  We 
use the average annual interest rate on three-month Treasury Bills, which represents the short-
term market rate of interest available to borrowers in international markets.   
Because it is possible that some firms face differential access to credit markets, we have 
also created two firm-specific measures that capture financial distress for individual firms, 
following the approach taken by Busse (2002).61  These variables are standard measures of firm 
indebtedness, namely the leverage ratio and interest coverage, and are defined as follows:  
Leverage ratio: 
(Total equity – Net stockholders’ equity) / Total equity 
                                                 
61 An alternate, and frequently used, method of assessing whether a firm is financially sound is to construct 
Altman’s “Z-score” (Altman, 1968).  The Z-score is calculated as a weighted average of five financial ratios.  
Although these ratios are generally calculable from Compustat data, because of the international nature and time 
span of our sample the data were not consistently available. 
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Interest coverage: 
(Operating profit – Non-operating expense + Depreciation) / Interest expense. 
We construct these ratios at the firm level for each cartel member firm in our cartel dataset 
using data from Compustat.62  In order to focus on changes in the discount rate that might disrupt 
cartel stability by causing a violation of the participation constraint, we define the annual cartel 
interest coverage each year as the minimum interest coverage ratio across all member firms.  
Analogously, we define the annual cartel leverage ratio as the maximum leverage ratio across all 
member firms in that year.  For example, for a given year for cartel j, we use   
max{leverage ratioi | for all firms i in cartel j}  as cartel j’s leverage ratio; and  
min{interest coveragei | for all firms i in cartel j}  as cartel j’s interest coverage ratio.  
These two variables, INTCOVERAGE and LEVRATIO, are intended to capture the effect on 
cartel duration of the most financially unstable firm in the cartel, and hence the firm with the 
greatest incentive to cheat.  By construction, these variables are allowed to vary over time within 
a cartel, representing the most financially vulnerable cartel member.  Although LEVRATIO is 
fairly stable, INTCOVERAGE varies quite a bit over a given cartel’s lifespan. 
There has been considerable discussion, though much less consensus, regarding the effect 
of macroeconomic fluctuations on cartel stability.  Green and Porter (1984) propose a model in 
which negative shocks to demand lead to the appearance of cartel breakup.  Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1986) propose an alternative model in which cartels become less effective during 
macroeconomic booms.  Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) reverse the Rotemberg and Saloner 
result by introducing auto-correlated shocks to demand.  Previous cross-sectional studies have 
found that macroeconomic volatility reduces cartel life spans (Suslow 2005, Dick 1996).  We 
examine this issue with respect to our sample of contemporary international cartels by estimating 
the effect of deviations from trend global GDP.   
                                                 
62 We use Compustat North America (Industrial Annual) for U.S. firms and Compustat Global 
(Industrial/Commercial) for non-U.S. firms.  Details on the construction of these measures are provided in the 
Appendix. 
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We measure demand fluctuations that might disrupt collusion by estimating a non-linear 
trend in GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (1997).63  The HP filter fits a smooth nonlinear 
trend curve to a time series by decomposing it into a non-stationary trend component and a 
stationary cyclical component.  Since relatively sophisticated firms are unlikely to be confused 
by predictable macroeconomic fluctuations, we hypothesize that it is deviations from this trend 
that may disrupt collusion.  In some theoretical specifications, cartels are disrupted by negative 
shocks to demand.  In others models it is demand variability more generally, including rapid 
demand growth, which is disruptive to collusive stability.  We calculate the difference between 
actual GDP and the HP filter, and distinguish between positive and negative shocks.   
Dick (1996) models demand shocks with a first-order autoregressive process, AR(1).64  
Although we could use a similar AR(1) linear regression in order to estimate the trend in GDP,  
we believe that using the HP filter allows for more sophisticated understanding of 
macroeconomic phenomenon on the part of cartel participants. Managers remember more than 
one period, and they can imagine economic shocks that are not linear.  The HP filter, a smoothed 
non-linear (weighted moving average) of the original series, accommodates this.  In other words, 
focusing on deviations from this non-linear trend assumes that managers have a sense of what is 
going on in their market that is not limited to a simple linear extrapolation of current events.   
Because these are international cartels, fluctuations in exchange rates are also potentially 
disruptive to collusion. 65  Cartel agreements reflect both the market price and production costs.  
Fluctuations in exchange rates can affect both of these, and affect cartel members producing in 
different countries asymmetrically so that previously agreed cartel prices and market shares may 
no longer be sustainable.  In order to capture this effect, we include the absolute value of the 
change in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar (using a trade-weighted index).   
We also consider the impact that the number of cartel members has on cartel stability.  The 
participation constraint suggests that, within in a single industry, cooperation can be sustained as 
                                                 
63The HP filter is a weighted moving average, where the researcher must specify the weight, or smoothing 
parameter, commonly denoted by λ.  The choice for λ recommended by Hodrick and Prescott varies with the 
frequency of the data.  We have annual GDP data, and thus we set λ = 6.25 (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). 
64 See Dick (1996), pp. 270-271.  Dick defines business cycles using export price indexes and then decomposes 
export price movements into anticipated and unanticipated components.  He finds that Webb-Pomerene export 
cartels between 1918 and 1965 were more prone to failure during anticipated downturns, but that the effect of 
unanticipated business cycle changes was insignificant. 
65 See Alexander (2003) for an elaboration and illustration of the impact of exchange rates on cartel stability. 
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long as the number of firms is below some critical threshold.  Because the number of firms may 
not affect cartel stability in a linear fashion, we have created a dummy variable MEM_OVER5 
that indicates whether the cartel has a “large” number of firms.  This “more than five” threshold 
is consistent with theoretical results that show that cooperation is much more difficult with large 
numbers of participants.66   
As discussed in the theoretical section above, customer concentration may also be an 
important determinant of cartel stability.  Stigler (1964) hypothesized that collusion would be 
more effective against buyers engaging in small purchases.  In his study of legal Webb-
Pomerene export cartels, Dick (1996) tests Stigler’s hypothesis by constructing a measure of 
customer concentration, proxied as the market share of the four largest consuming countries of 
each Webb-Pomerene association’s exports.  He finds that Webb-Pomerene cartels selling into 
relatively more concentrated consuming markets tended to be less stable.67  There is anecdotal 
evidence, however, suggesting that cartels treat large customers differently, reducing their 
destabilizing effect.68  In the electrical and mechanical carbon products cartel, for example, large 
customers had bargaining power and did not always accept the announced cartel price.  In the 
sorbates cartel, producers explicitly set a separate target price for the largest or “ultrabig” 
purchasers.69   
While we have no data on customer size for the firms in our sample, we have followed 
Dick in constructing a measure of downstream industry concentration.  We define the variable 
CUSTCONC as the HHI of the primary downstream consuming industry (defined at the 4-digit 
SIC or 6-digit NAICS level) for each cartel.  We obtain HHI estimates from the quinquennial 
U.S. Census of Manufacturing, 1982 to 2002.70  This measure varies from our ideal measure in 
two ways.  First, we must choose one primary downstream industry.  Since the primary 
                                                 
66 Selten’s (1973) classic article presents a Cournot model of cartel formation where the dividing line between 
“small” and “large” is five firms.  As he explains in the introduction, the basic intuition for this result is the “fact 
that the position of an outsider becomes relatively more attractive as the number of competitors is increased…” (p. 
142).  We test for other threshold values for our “MEM_OVER” dummy variable, such as 4 and 6, but the 
MEM_OVER5 variable performed the best.  See the results section below. 
67 Dick (1996), p. 261. 
68 See Levenstein and Suslow (2006), pp. 61-64, for a review of the empirical literature on the relationship between 
customer size and cartel stability. 
69 Commission Decision of 3 December 2003, Case C.38.359- Electrical and Mechanical Carbon and Graphite 
Products, par. 76 and 106, as examples.  For the sorbates cartel, see "United States of America v. Yuji Komatsu, 
Yoshihiko Katsuyama, Wakao Shinoda, and Hitoshi Hayashi" Indictment, Jan. 23, 2001, available at:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f7300/7366.htm.   
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consuming industry represents only a portion of cartel sales, our measure over-estimates 
downstream concentration.  However, if the portion of sales to the primary consuming industry is 
roughly uniform across cartels, then the variation in our measure of concentration will correctly 
capture the variation in customer concentration faced by the different cartels in our sample.  To 
the extent that the diversification of sales across consuming industries varies across cartels, we 
have unmeasured variation that our variable CUSTCONC misses.  Second, our measure of 
concentration is based on the concentration of U.S. consuming industries.  While the U.S. 
Census Bureau data gives us a consistent measure that spans our sample period, it is possible that 
customer industry concentration varies across the national markets in which these international 
cartels operated, again giving rise to unmeasured variation.  Despite the problems with this 
measure, it does allow us to begin to address an issue that has been frequently discussed but 
infrequently studied empirically in previous studies.  
Finally, ideally we would like to control for differences in the elasticity of demand across 
industries.  Unfortunately, we simply do not have the necessary to data to estimate demand 
elasticities across all of the industries in our cross-section.  Therefore, in order to control for at 
least some idiosyncratic differences across industries, we include sector dummy variables for the 
broad industry group in which each cartel operates.  These are, as listed in Table 4 along with 
their means, CHEM (chemicals sector), MTL&MINRL (metals and minerals), OTHMFG (other 
manufacturing, such as carbonless paper and haberdashery products), and NONMFG (non-
manufacturing industries, such as services, water transportation, and construction).71 
V. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
A. Full-Sample Results 
We first estimate the determinants of the probability of cartel breakup on the full sample 
(Table 6), and then look at several sub-sample estimates, focusing on particular variables of 
interest where data availability was limited.  Parameter estimates greater than one indicate that 
                                                                                                                                                             
70 Further details on how this variable was constructed are given in the Appendix.   
71 In his theoretical model, Harrington (2006) also chooses to broadly parameterize industries, and explains his 
motivation as follows:  “In modelling a population of industries, it is compelling to allow industries to vary in terms 
of cartel stability.  For this purpose, I assume industries may differ in terms of the parameter η.  If one takes this 
assumption literally, it can be motivated by heterogeneity in the elasticity of firm demand or the number of firms (as 
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the variable has a positive effect on the probability of cartel breakup.  Parameter estimates less 
than one indicate that the variable decreases the probability of breakup, increasing cartel stability 
and expected duration.   
We find that increases in organizational sophistication are generally associated with 
increases in cartel duration.  Our econometric specifications with disaggregate organizational 
characteristics focus on those organizational features for which we have the best and most 
reliable measures:  market allocation mechanisms, monitoring, the development of a complex 
hierarchy within the cartel, and whether the cartel used compensation or other sorts of 
punishments when participants violated the cartel agreement.  Cartels that used market allocation 
mechanisms were significantly less likely to break up than those that did not (Table 6, models 1 
and 2).  Our point estimate of 0.31 implies that the use of market allocation mechanisms reduced 
the probability of breakup by 69 percent.  The other elements of our organizational measure are 
not statistically significant.  In order to preserve degrees of freedom and to better capture overall 
organizational sophistication we combine all eleven cartel characteristics into ORGINDX (Table 
6, model 3).  Increases in this organizational index significantly reduce the probability of cartel 
breakup: an increase of one in ORGINDX decreases the likelihood of cartel breakup by 12 
percent. 
The coefficient on Mem_OVER5 (a dummy variable indicating whether a cartel had more 
than five members) is greater than one, as hypothesized.  This suggests that large cartels are 
more likely to dissolve, all else equal.  In results not reported here, we instead included the 
number of cartel participants in the specification and found similar results.  However, in neither 
case is the coefficient significantly different from one.  Variables measuring the number of cartel 
members, however constructed, may have a larger effect on the industries in which collusion is 
attempted than on how long the cartel lasts.  We discuss our cartel member variable further 
below in estimates where we also control for industry concentration. 
Perhaps the single most robust result of the repeated game literature on collusion is that as 
players become more impatient, collusion is harder to sustain (Friedman, 1971).  This prediction 
has rarely been tested in cross-section studies; we do so here by including a measure of short 
                                                                                                                                                             
with the Bertrand price game).  Our intent is not to be literal but rather to think of this as a parsimonious way in 
which to encompass industry heterogeneity” (p. 5). 
37 
term interest rates (TBILL, the 3 month Treasury-bill rate).  Somewhat paradoxically, we find 
that increases in the rate of interest significantly decrease the probability of cartel breakup (Table 
6, models 1, 2, and 3).   There are several possible explanations of this result.   First, it may be 
that using T-bill rates confounds the discount rate and overall macroeconomic fluctuations.  
Interest rates tend to increase during macroeconomic expansions, and cartels are generally 
believed to be more likely to dissolve during macroeconomic contractions.  Second, it may be 
that this particular measure of the interest rate does not reflect the discount rate of cartel 
participants.  In particular, short-term fluctuations in market interest rates may be less important 
than the overall time horizon of cartel participants.  Firms that are likely to respond to short-term 
fluctuations in market interest rates may not have the long horizon necessary to sustain, or even 
attempt, collusion.  In order to address these concerns, we develop and test alternative measures 
of the discount rate.  Because of data availability problems, the use of these firm-specific 
measures reduces our sample size.  We discuss these results further below. 
Turning to our full-sample estimates of the direct impact of macroeconomic fluctuations, 
we examine the effects of shocks to GDP.  We include positive and negative shocks to GDP as 
separate variables in order to allow the data to tell us whether cartels responded to economic 
upturns and downturns symmetrically.  As described above, we measure shocks as the difference 
between actual and trend GDP, with the GDP trend determined by the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  If 
actual GDP is greater than trend, the variable POS_HP takes the value of the difference and the 
variable NEG_HP takes the value zero.  Analogously, if the difference between actual GDP and 
trend GDP is negative, POS_HP takes the value zero and NEG_HP takes the value of the 
difference.  We find that positive shocks to GDP have no impact on cartel stability (Table 6, 
model 1).  However, negative deviations from trend GDP show a consistent, statistically 
significant impact on the probability of breakup.  A negative shock to GDP of the average size of 
such shocks over this period would increase the probability that a cartel would fail by 48 percent 
(Table 6, model 1).72   
                                                 
72 The calculation of 48 percent is based on multiplying the un-rounded coefficient on HP_NEG, 1.006786, by the 
mean of HP_NEG, -70.96 (Table 5). We also tried a specification of demand “shocks” including squared deviations 
from the HP trend to capture the idea that large deviations, in either a positive or negative direction, may disrupt 
collusion.  This measure had no significant effect on the probability of cartel breakup. 
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Others have suggested that rapid growth in demand as well as overall volatility may disrupt 
cartels.73  Marquez (1994) uses a weighted average of GNP growth rates for Germany, Japan, the 
UK, and U.S., where the weights are the proportion of cartel members from that country.  He 
finds that faster demand growth reduces cartel duration, but the coefficient is insignificant (p. 
338).  The comparable measure for our sample would be global GDP growth.  While the results 
are not reported here, the coefficient on GDP growth was not significant in any of the 
specifications estimated.  It may be that an analysis of individual cartels would find a causal 
relationship between demand growth and cartel breakdown, but that this relationship is not 
captured by global GDP growth, which may mask industry or product specific trends.  It may 
also be that previous international cartel cross-section studies that found a significant relationship 
between macroeconomic volatility and cartel duration (Marquez 1994, Suslow 2005) were 
picking up the effect of a unique historical episode, as these studies examined cartels that 
spanned the Great Depression of the 1930s.   
We find that exchange rate fluctuations had no significant effect on cartel stability (Table 
6, models 1, 2, and 3).  Again, this may reflect the difficulty in capturing the shocks to individual 
cartels using aggregate data (in this case, a trade-weighted index of the value of the U.S. dollar).  
The relevant fluctuations in the exchange rate depend on the location of production for cartel 
participants and the regions in which the cartel participants agree to fix price.  The nationality of 
cartel members as well as the geographic scope of the cartels varies over the sample.  Therefore, 
different pairwise exchange rates may better capture the shocks faced by individual cartels, but 
adding pairwise exchange rates for each of the countries with cartel participants (and customer 
markets) in this sample of global cartels would exhaust the degrees of freedom provided by the 
size of our sample. 
Our controls for the sectors in which the cartel participates (Table 6, model 3) suggest that 
cartels in the chemical industry may be longer lived than cartels in other industries.  This may 
reflect differences in elasticity of demand, as we suggested above.  Alternatively, it may reflect 
the long history of collusion among the firms in this particular sector.74   
                                                 
73 Marquez (1994), p. 332. 
74 For histories of cartels in the chemical industries, see Haber (1958, 1971), Stocking (1931), and Stocking and 
Watkins (1946, 1948). 
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B. Measures of Concentration and Financial Distress 
We now turn to our examination of several determinants of cartel stability for which there 
were particularly difficult data problems.  As a result, the inclusion of each of these variables 
reduces the sample size.  The reader is cautioned that the sample varies across the specifications 
we report here, and that with such a small sample the change in sample composition may have 
confounding effects.  In results not presented here, we test for pure sample effects by comparing 
the parameter estimates obtained for the full-sample models 1, 2, and 3 when estimated only on 
these sub-samples.  In no case does the reduction of sample size change our qualitative results:  
there is no reversal in the direction of the effect of the variables.  However, statistical 
significance is reduced by the reduction in sample size.  In order to preserve degrees of freedom, 
we conduct these analyses using ORGINDX, our aggregate index of the various cartel 
organizational features.  
1. Producer Concentration 
Our measure of industry concentration is MINC4, the minimum four-firm concentration 
ratio during the life of the cartel (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics).  In some cases we have 
the actual C4, while in others we estimate MINC4 using market share data on the top two or top 
three firms, if that is all we were able to obtain.  For example, the bromine cartel lasted from 
1995 to 1998 and at that time the world market consisted of three major producers.75  The three-
firm global concentration ratio was 83 percent in 1998.76  The C4 would certainly be higher, but 
at a minimum it would be at least 83 percent.   
As has been the case in previous cross-sectional studies, industry concentration does not 
have a significant effect on cartel duration (Table 7, model 4).  However, the inclusion of the 
concentration ratio variable increases the size and statistical significance of the variable 
MEM_OVER5, reinforcing our prior belief that increasing the number of firms in a cartel has an 
economically and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of cartel breakup.  It may be 
that without controlling for industry concentration, that effect was masked. 
                                                 
75 Joseph Chang, “Market for Brominated Flame Retardants Remains under Pressure,” Chemical Market Reporter, 
Sept. 27, 1999 (p. 3). 
76 Susan Warren, “Great Lakes is Assisting Bromine Probe,” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1999 (p. A3). 
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2. Customer Concentration 
Adding our measure of customer concentration (the United States HHI of the primary 
consuming industry), reduces the sample size from 72 to 44 cartels. The coefficient on 
CUSTCONC is 1.00, showing no effect of differences in customer concentration on cartel 
stability.  While this may reflect our small sample size or our inability to measure global 
concentration of the consuming industry, this result is consistent with our general observation 
that large customers do not increase the incentive of firms to cheat on the cartel.  Rather, these 
large customers simply receive discounts—agreed upon by cartel members—from the cartel 
price. The general results are otherwise quite similar to our earlier specifications.  Increased 
organizational sophistication and higher interest rates are associated with less likelihood of cartel 
breakup.  Negative shocks to GDP have a small but statistically significant positive effect on the 
likelihood of cartel breakup. 
3. Financial Distress 
Given the perverse results that we find for the effect of fluctuations in market interest rates 
on cartel stability, it seemed desirable to identify an alternative measure of firm impatience.  Due 
to data limitations created by the international nature of our sample and the time period, the 
number of cartels in the sample falls to 56.  We report statistically insignificant but nonetheless 
quite thought-provoking results.  When the variable INTCOVERAGE was included (in results 
not reported here), it had the expected sign.  In Table 7, model 6, we report the results using a 
slightly different variable, INTCOVERAGE<1:  this dummy variable indicates whether any 
member of the cartel had insufficient net income in a particular year to cover its annual required 
debt payments.  The coefficient on the interest coverage variable is 1.52, indicating that the 
presence of a cartel member with income insufficient to cover interest payments increases the 
probability of cartel breakup by 52 percent.  Although this variable performs better than the 
continuous variable (INTCOVERAGE), the coefficient is statistically insignificant.  Our second 
measure of firm-specific impatience is the firm leverage ratio.  Again, we focus on the most 
leveraged firm in the cartel, and find that increases in the leverage of the most leveraged firm in 




C. Competing Hazard Model and Cause of Breakup 
In order to capture the effects of antitrust policy on cartel breakup, we estimate a 
competing hazard model in which we examine the determinants of “death by antitrust 
investigation” as distinguished from other causes of cartel breakup.77  We are particularly 
interested in two issues:  first, if there are antitrust breakups that are not related to economic 
fluctuations, we may get more precise estimates of the effects of economic fluctuations if we 
distinguish the cause of breakup.  Second, we would like to better understand whether 
government amnesty and leniency programs affect cartel stability, and if so, how.  Do these 
programs disrupt cartels that are on the verge of falling apart, as suggested by the theoretical 
analysis above, or are they targeting the most successful cartels, as suggested by the longevity 
measures reported above? 
Because firms elect when to apply for amnesty, we assume that variables that affect cartel 
stability and profitability will affect the decision to apply for amnesty.  We would not expect 
those variables to affect other types of antitrust investigations of cartels, including the antitrust 
follow-on cases. Unfortunately, splitting the sample into different causes of failure greatly 
reduces sample size.  The resulting estimates are imprecise and generally not statistically 
significant.  We present them here because the questions are important for both theory and 
antitrust policy, and we believe they provide a starting point for an empirically-informed 
discussion of these issues.   
We find that increases in the extent of cartel organization significantly decrease the 
likelihood of breakup (by 14 percent) for those cartels eventually broken up by the antitrust 
authorities.  Our point estimate of the effect of cartel organization on the stability of those cartels 
that break up on their own is similar, but is not statistically significant.  Our point estimates also 
suggest that antitrust investigation and breakup are more likely for cartels with more than five 
members, while breaking up on their own is more likely for smaller cartels, but this finding is 
statistically insignificant (Table 8). 
                                                 




In order to interpret the results presented here correctly, we must be clear about what we 
are measuring when we measure cartel duration.  Cartel duration is not the same as cartel 
success.  In fact, the cartels most successful at raising price may not endure if they also 
encourage entry.   
Industry concentration may influence where cartels are attempted, but differences in 
concentration do not appear to affect duration.  In general, shocks to the economic environment 
can destabilize a cartel’s equilibrium price and output allocation, and eventually cause the end of 
the cartel.  In particular, as suggested in some theoretical models, negative deviations from trend 
growth have a negative impact on cartel stability.   
Despite the destabilizing effect of negative economic shocks, we find that there are durable 
cartels that develop mechanisms to cope with such economic variability.  Cartels have developed 
sophisticated organizational mechanisms that limit the incentive to cheat, monitor each other’s 
actions, and create barriers to entry.  We consistently find that cartel organization facilitates 
cartel longevity.  Assigning markets or customers to firms is a particularly effective tool for 
extending cartel life.78  Thus, international markets may be much more amenable to collusion 
than has generally been presumed by advocates of unregulated globalization.   
Amnesty and leniency policies have become an important tool in antitrust authorities’ 
battle with international cartels.  The empirical results presented here, though preliminary in 
nature, suggest that the cartels induced to apply for amnesty are longer lasting than the average 
cartel.  While there are theoretical reasons to expect that firms will report the least profitable 
cartels, the evidence here does not suggest any systematic differences between those cartels 
offered up for amnesty and other cartels. 
 
                                                 
78 Stigler (1964) made this point:  “Fixing market shares is probably the most efficient of all methods of combating 
secret price reductions” (p. 46). 
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APPENDIX 
Cartel Data:  Information on the number of cartel members, the dates of operation of the cartel, 
the various organizational characteristics of the cartel, market shares and four-firm concentration 
ratios come from a variety of publicly available sources.  These sources are primarily 
Department of Justice, European Commission, and Canadian Competition Bureau press releases, 
European Commission decisions, and judgments released by the European Court of Justice and 
European Court of First Instance.  In addition, a variety of industry and business news sources 
were used, such as American Metal Market, Chemical Marketing Reporter, European Business 
Week, International Cement Magazine, Oil and Gas Journal, and Wall Street Journal.  Specific 
sources are available from the authors upon request. 
Treasury-bill rate:  Annual U.S. Treasury-bill, 3-month maturity, secondary market rates are 
from the Federal Reserve Board’s website at: 
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/h15/data/Annual_Dec/H15_TB_M3.txt 
GDP:  Annual world and U.S. GDP, in real 2000 U.S. dollars, come from the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture website at: 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/macroeconomics/Data/HistoricalRealGDPValues.xls 
Exchange Rate:  Quarterly exchange rate data from 1971 through 2002 come from Linda 
Goldberg’s web page on the New York Federal Reserve Bank:  
 http://www.ny.frb.org/research/economists/goldberg/papers.html.   
From this website, we used the total manufacturing exchange rate from the “Database on 
Industry-Specific Exchange Rates.”  
Market Concentration of Consuming Industry:  Each cartel’s customers were identified, where 
possible, using lists of plaintiffs in civil damage cases against the cartel members.  These 
plaintiff lists were compiled using docket information available on the Westlaw legal research 
database.  We searched Westlaw for U.S. district court cases only.  The primary SIC and NAICS 
industry codes were then obtained for each plaintiff company from Hoover’s or Thomson 
Research.  We then chose one SIC code and one NAICS code to represent the downstream 
industry for each cartel.  The choice of the representative downstream industry was based either 
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on the majority of customers or the most representative customer, if there was not a clear 
majority.  For example, the citric acid cartel members were sued by numerous buyers, 
representing a variety of food-related industries, but the majority of the plaintiffs were from 
NAICS 312111 (Soft-Drink Manufacturing).  For the rubber chemicals cartel there was no clear 
industry majority among the suing customers, but research on the cartel revealed that their 
primary customers were tire manufacturers.  We therefore chose NAICS 326211 (Tire 
Manufacturing, except Retreading) as the primary customer code.  In those instances without 
litigation—for example, there are no U.S. civil cases against the European cement cartel in our 
sample—we identified the downstream industry based on other research.  In the case of cement, 
it was clear that the main customers would be the ready-mix concrete producers (NAICS 
327320).  For each downstream industry we assigned HHI data published by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, "Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing," Economic Census.  Data 
for 2002 and 1997 are available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/concentration.html.  For 
historical data, we used a compiled series available at:  
http://www.wooster.edu/economics/archive/indconc.html.   
Although 1997 and 2002 HHI data are available in both value added and value of shipments, the 
1992 and earlier data from the Wooster archive are given only for value of shipments.  Published 
data are restricted to manufacturing, and therefore the early HHI data based on SIC codes has 
codes starting with only 2's and 3's, while the 1997 and 2002 data only lists NAICS codes 
starting with 3.  For each year of the cartel’s lifespan we assign the HHI number in five-year 
intervals, ranging from 1982 through 2002, as follows:  1982 HHI is used for all observations 
through 1984; 1987 HHI is used for 1985-1989; 1992 HHI for 1990-1994; 1997 HHI for 1995-
1999; and 2002 HHI for 2000-2002. 
Firm Financial Distress:  We collected data to build these ratios at the firm level from 
Compustat North America (Industrial Annual) for U.S. firms and Compustat Global 
(Industrial/Commercial) for non-U.S. firms.  The first step was to locate each cartel member firm 
in the Compustat database and identify its Global Vantage Company key (GVKEY).  For North 
America, data is available for each firm with a GVKEY for the full sample period 1971-2002, 
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but Compustat Global only contains data from 1993 – 2005.79  An additional complication is that 
variables names are not consistent across the two databases.  In constructing the leverage ratio 
we used the following data from Compustat (name of variable and “data tag” as provided by 
Compustat):  Total Liabilities (Data 181 in Compustat North America and Data 118 in 
Compustat Global), Shareholders’ Equity (Data 216 in Compustat North America and Data 135 
in Compustat Global).80  The interest coverage variable was calculated from Operating Income 
(after depreciation), Total Non-operating Income Expense, Total Depreciation, and Interest 
Expense.  The data tags for these variables, respectively, were Data 178, 61, 14, and 15 from 
Compustat North America and Data 14, 16, 11, and 15 from Compustat Global.   
For most of the cartels in our sample, at least one cartel member was located in the 
Compustat database, but there are six cartels for which no member firm could be found.81  The 
number of cartels in the sample therefore drops from 72 to 56.  The number of observations, 
however, drops further:  of the 364 unique cartel member firms in our sample, only 192 have 
Compustat GVKEYs, so that in practice we are not able to calculate the two measures of 
financial distress across all members of each cartel.82   
 
                                                 
79 There are six cartels for which no GVKEY exists for any cartel member firm.  In addition, we lose six cartels 
because of lack of data before 1993.  Thus, a total of twelve cartels drop from the sample when we add the financial 
distress measures. 
80 Busse’s (2002) published paper includes two typographical errors in Table 1, where the definitions of these 
variables are summarized.  We use corrected definitions provided by Busse. 
81 These cartels are beer (Luxembourg), marine transportation services, plastic dinnerware, stamp auctions, tampico 
fiber, and zinc phosphate. 
82 Twelve of the 364 firms are actually subsidiaries of parent companies that were also indicted for price-fixing, 
either in the same cartel or a different one. 
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SECTORAL COMPOSITION OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 
Industry Percentagea 
Chemicals 42% 
Other Manufacturing 38% 
Water Transport 14% 
Construction 4% 
Services 3% 
a Percentages are based on a simple count of the number of cartels and are not 





CARTEL DURATION:  COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS STUDIES 




Eckboa Griffinb Suslowc Posnerd Gallo et al.e 
Mean (years) 7.5 5.3 7.3 8.3 7.5 5.4 
Standard 
deviation  
5.4  6.3 6.2   
Range 1 – 29 1 –18 1 – 29 1 – 13   
% <5 years 32%   40%   
%  > 10 years 21%   37%   
 
Notes: 
a Eckbo (1976) covers 51 international agreements from the late 1800s through the 1960s.  We calculate an average 
duration for the cartels in Eckbo’s study.  In the original work, he reports separate averages for different sub-
samples. 
b Griffin (1989) samples 54 international cartels from 1888 to 1984. 
c Suslow (2005) samples 71 international cartel episodes in 45 industries between 1920 and 1939.  The mean 
duration of the 28 cartel episodes not censored by World War II is 3.7 years with a standard deviation of 3 years.  
d Posner (1970) examines all 989 Department of Justice horizontal price fixing cases from 1890 to 1969, but he 
reports average duration and related statistics only for cases from 1950 to 1969.   








Hay & Kelley b Fraas & 
Greer 
Posner Gallo et al. 
Market Allocationa 81% 35% 26% 26% 27% 
Bid Rigging 22% 29% 19% 14% 30% 
Distributor Involvement 14%     
Terms & Conditions of 
Sales Set 
47% 14% 5% 14%  
Product Standardization 6%     
Monitoring 72%     
Hierarchy 39%     
Trade Association 
Involvement 
29% 29% 36% 44% 23% 
Compensation Rules 28%   4% (“system of 





39% 5% 12%   
 
Notes: 
a  Market allocation includes use of production quotas, division of markets, division of territories, and allocation of 
customers. 
b Hay and Kelley (1974) sample includes 65 DOJ convictions for horizontal price fixing between 1963 and 1972.  
Not all industry characteristics were available for each case.  For example, trade association information is available 
in 62 cases and concentration data in only 50 cases. In calculating the mean of their sample, they exclude four cases 




VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Number of Cartels = 72 unless otherwise stated 
 
Variable Name Definition Min Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
MEM_OVER5 1 if cartel has more than five 
members 
0 1 0.43 0.5 
MINC4 
(48 cartels) 
Minimum four-firm concentration 
ratio 
40 100 78.67 18.4 
CUSTCONC 
(44 cartels) 
HHI index for cartel’s primary 
consuming industry 
25 2662.4 665.23 704.97 
ORGINDX Sum of dummy variables describing 
cartel organization (the 11 variables 
defined immediately below) 
0 11 3.76 2.06 
BIDRIGORG 1 if bids were rigged 0 1 0.22 0.42 
MKTALLOCORG 1 if shares, regions, or customers 
were explicitly assigned to cartel 
members 
0 1 0.81 0.40 
STDIZEORG 1 if cartel standardized product 
characteristics 
0 1 0.06 0.23 
OTHERTERMSORG 1 if cartel set terms other than price 
(i.e., limiting discounts or terms of 
sale) 
0 1 0.47 0.50 
DISTNORG 1 if cartel included distributors or 
vertically integrated 
producer/distributor firms 
0 1 0.14 0.35 
TAORG 1 if trade association involved 0 1 0.29 0.46 
MONITORORG 1 if sales information exchanged for 
monitoring purposes 
0 1 0.72 0.45 
DISCIPLINORG 1 if retaliatory action taken 
following cheating 
0 1 0.13 0.33 
COMPENSORG 1 if members agreed to a 
compensation scheme 
0 1 0.28 0.45 
EXCLUSORG 1 if cartel took exclusionary action 
against non-members 
0 1 0.26 0.44 
HIERARCHORG 1 if multiple levels of organizational 
hierarchy existed within cartel 
0 1 0.39 0.49 
CHEATORG Sum of DISCIPLINORG and 
COMPENSORG 
0 2 0.40 0.60 
CHEM 1 if cartel in chemicals sector 0 1 0.42 0.50 
MTL&MINRL 1 if cartel in metals or minerals 
sector 
0 1 0.18 0.39 
OTHMFG 1 if cartel in other manufacturing 
sector 
0 1 0.19 0.40 
58 
NONMFG 1 if cartel in non-manufacturing 
sector 
0 1 0.21 0.41 
INTCOVERAGE 
(56 cartels) 
Interest coverage ratio for cartel 
member firms 
-6.13 16.19 4.24 3.66 
INTCOVERAGE<1 
(56 cartels) 
1 if INTCOVERAGE is less than 1 0 1 0.18 0.39 
LEVRATIO 
(56 cartels) 
Financial leverage ratio for cartel 
member firms 
0.54 1.25 0.77 0.14 
T-BILL 
(32 annual observations) 
Annual average rate on U.S. 
Treasury bills, 3-month maturity 
1.6 14.0 6.38 2.66 
POS_HP 
(32 annual observations) 
Level of gap between GDP and 
trend (using HP filter) if gap is 
positive ($ billions) 
0 377.5 79.92 119.70 
NEG_HP 
(32 annual observations) 
Level of gap between GDP and 
trend (using HP filter) if gap is 
negative ($ billions) 
-357.69 0 -70.96 100.36 
XER_SHOCK 
(32 annual observations) 
Absolute value of the difference 
between current and lagged 
exchange rate index value 




CAUSES OF CARTEL BREAKUP 
Cause of Breakup Number of cartels Average Duration 
(years) 
Government-Initiated Breakup Triggered By:   
Amnesty application 11 9.5 
Follow-on investigation 13 8.2 
Customer complaint 8 5.3 
Other sources (including whistleblowers) 28 7.6 
Other Breakup   
Cheating 2 1.5 
Growing fringe 7 6.4 
Unknown Cause of Breakup 3 8.0 




PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL 
Full Sample of 72 Cartels 































































CHEM   0.67 
(-1.21) 
MTL&MINRL   0.79 
(-0.55) 
NONMFG   0.82 
(-0.49) 
Number of Cartels 72 72 72 
Number of Obs. 540 540 540 
Log likelihood -223.8 -224.3 -228.9 







*(**) The coefficient is significantly different from 1 for a 10% (5%) two-tail test. 
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TABLE 7 
PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL 
Adding producer and consumer concentration and financial distress variables 
















































CUSTCONC  1.00 
(0.01) 
 
INTCOVERAGE<1   1.52 
(1.04) 
LEVRATIO   3.56 
(1.49) 
Number of Cartels 48 44 56 
Number of Obs. 350 330 241 
Log likelihood -135.4 -119.9 -148.1 







*(**) The coefficient is significantly different from 1 for a 10% (5%) two-tail test. 
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TABLE 8 
COMPETING HAZARDS MODEL BY CAUSE OF BREAKUP 
Variable Model 7 
 
Breakup Due to Other Antitrust 




Breakup Due to Amnesty 
Application, Cheating, or 
Growing Fringe 












T-BILL  0.81 
(-1.09) 
NEG_HP  1.00 
(0.73) 
XER_SHOCK  0.89 
(-1.07) 
Number of Cartel 
Failures 
49 23 
Number of Obs. 540 540 
Log likelihood -164.8 -74.4 





*(**) The coefficient is significantly different from 1 for a 10% (5%) two-tail test. 
 
